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What’s Next for VEBAs? The Impact of Declining Employer-Provided  
Health Care Coverage and the Affordable Care Act 
 
Erin S. Leighty 
 
The Backdrop: A Long-term Decline in Retiree Health Care Benefits 
Employer-provided health benefits have been declining for many years in the United 
States.  In 2010, 17.7% of workers were employed by companies that offered health coverage to 
early retirees; this figure was 28.9% in 1997.  Among state government employers, 70% offered 
early retiree medical benefits in 2010 versus 94.9% in 2003 (Adams and Fronstin, 2012).  Many 
have argued that the genesis for this downward trend in coverage was the 1990 Financial 
Accounting Standards Board’s issuance of Statement no. 106, Employer’s Accounting for 
Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions.  FAS 106 required employers to account for 
unfunded future postretirement health care benefits as a liability on their financial statements and 
to expense costs for future retiree health benefits over an employee’s working lifetime.  For 
many companies, FAS 106 had a significant impact.  For example, in 1992, the first year in 
which companies were required to comply with FAS 106, General Motors (“GM”) and Ford 
Motor Company (“Ford”) reported a $20.8 billion and a $7.5 billion charge, respectively, to 
account for these liabilities (Moore, 2008).  In 2004, the Government Accounting Standards 
Board (GASB) issued similar requirements for public plans.   
Prior to these rulings, private and public employers were only required to expense 
current-year spending for retiree health benefits.  The sudden accounting for significant retiree 
health care liabilities led many employers to reduce coverage.  Additionally, the rapidly rising 
cost of medical care has made these liabilities and the incentives for reducing them all the more 
significant. This paper is primarily concerned with the experiences of non-government 
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employers; however the trends and implications are very similar.  The experience of the private 
sector may serve as a leading indicator of public sector policies. 
 
A Brief Background on VEBAs 
As expenses related to retiree health benefits have come to the fore over the past two 
decades, the VEBA structure became attractive as a tax-exempt savings vehicle and as a 
compromise solution between employers looking to shed their liability and employees wanting to 
safeguard their benefits. VEBAs are tax-exempt organizations set up to pay for employee health 
and welfare benefits; they are typically set up as trusts, but they can also be structured as 
corporations or associations.  A VEBA must be a voluntary association of employees who have a 
common employment-related bond.   
VEBAs were codified under Section 501(c)(9) of the Internal Revenue Code; the 
structure was initially established in 1928.  While traditional, employer-controlled VEBAs have 
long been used to set aside assets for specific benefit functions, the past ten years have seen the 
development of the “stand-alone VEBA” model (Moore, 2008).  The stand-alone model 
establishes the VEBA as an independent entity, separating it from the employer and divesting the 
employer’s future benefit obligations.  
That VEBAs have been particularly common among unionized workforces is a result of 
two factors.  First, the requirement of a voluntary association with a common employment bond 
is easily satisfied by a collective bargaining agreement or membership in a labor union.  Second, 
the tax benefits for union plans are more favorable than those for non-union plans.  Non-union 
VEBAs are limited in the amount of tax-deductible contributions they can make each year; future 
health costs can be pre-funded, but this funding must be based on current costs, with no 
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adjustments allowed for inflation or utilization growth.  Any contributions above these limits will 
incur unrelated business income tax to the employer.  Union plans have no such funding limits 
and are not subject to the unrelated business income tax (Borzi, 2009).   
Unlike defined benefit pension benefits, U.S. employers are not required to fund post-
retirement health benefits in advance.  Most do not, opting instead to use a pay-as-you-go 
structure (O’Brien, 2008).  In 2012, funding of other post-retirement benefits (OPEB) across 
S&P 500 companies was reported to be 22.3%; companies had set aside $67 billion in assets to 
meet $302 billion in reported OPEB obligations.  In contrast, the funding ratio for pension plans 
was 77.3% (Silverblatt, 2013).  This lack of funding is partly a result of the difficulty in pre-
funding these obligations.  There are few tax-advantaged structures which allow non-unionized 
employers to pre-fund; the VEBA allows for pre-funding but only at current costs and 
assumptions.  While FAS 106 required firms to account for postretirement health care benefits, 
there is no concurrent requirement to fund these benefits and there are limited structures in place 
to provide for this funding.  
Also unlike pension obligations, retiree health care benefits do not vest to employees 
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and are thus less likely to 
be considered legally-enforceable obligations. Company managements contend that retiree health 
care is a voluntary benefit offered by the employer and can thus be amended or reversed at any 
time (Bernstein, 2010).  Courts have offered mixed decisions on employers’ legal obligations.  In 
practice, courts have been more likely to uphold the benefit obligation if it was made as a result 
of collective bargaining or if the employer has made statements or taken actions that could be 
construed as a contractual promise to provide retiree health coverage (Moore, 2008).   
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These actions could include the establishment of a well-funded retiree health care asset 
pool such as a VEBA.  The nature of the pay-as-you-go structure for employee health benefits 
and the fact that the obligation is more likely to be viewed as voluntary and amendable on the 
part of the employer has thus limited the funds set aside for retiree health benefits.  While data 
on the overall funding status of the average VEBA trust is not available, it is assumed that most 
VEBAs, similar to OPEB obligations as a whole, are significantly underfunded (Cancelosi, 
2014).  VEBA trusts are irrevocable; companies are also hesitant to move funds from their 
general asset pool into a VEBA because they lose the optionality to re-allocate those funds 
should the employer alter benefits or should another business need arise. 
 
Growth and Decline in VEBA Plan Numbers 
As shown in Figure 1, in 2013 some 6,884 organizations that filed tax returns as VEBAs 
with the IRS. The number of VEBAs had peaked earlier, in 1993, with more than 15,000 but this 
figure declined since then, concurrent with the overall decline of retiree health care benefits.  
Notably, there was a marked drop-off in the number of VEBAs between 2010 and 2011 (IRS 
Data Book Table 25, 1991-2013).   
Figure 1: Number of Organizations Filing Tax Returns as VEBAs
                            
Source: 1991-2013 data: Internal Revenue Service Data Book; 1976-1990 data: Bernstein, 2010 
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It seems likely that this sharp decline is directly correlated with the passage of the 
Affordable Care Act in 2010.  Given the ACA provision restricting tax-exempt accounts from 
paying for exchange premiums or supplemental coverage, many companies may be abandoning 
their VEBA plans in favor of HSA or defined contribution health care accounts.  These 
restrictions are discussed in more detail below. 
The 2007 agreement between the UAW and the Big Three US auto companies that 
funded an independent VEBA with assets of $57 billion was a major milestone for retiree health 
care benefits, as both the automakers and the UAW made concessions in order to broker a deal 
and protect benefits.  Because VEBAs move assets beyond the reach of a firm’s creditors, the 
structure has been popular for firms in financial distress or emerging from bankruptcy 
restructuring (Borzi, 2009).  Most recently, a VEBA plan has been approved for general retirees 
in the Detroit bankruptcy (Dolan, 2014). Although there is continued growth in stand-alone 
VEBA plans, the number of traditional plans is declining. 
The 2010 passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) is likely to 
accelerate many employers’ exit from providing retiree health coverage.  Prior to the ACA, pre-
65 aged retirees not yet eligible for Medicare had few good options for affordable health 
insurance.  This has now changed with the establishment of national health insurance exchanges.  
Employers seeking to reduce or terminate retiree health benefits will be able to direct former 
employees to the exchanges as a replacement for the foregone benefits.  Therefore, there are 
likely to be fewer employers offering retiree health benefits and, subsequently, a reduced need 
for VEBAs (Reuther, 2011).  Data on the number of VEBA plans seem to offer evidence of this. 
 
Stand-Alone VEBAs 
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Most VEBAs are set up and maintained by employers, in order to segregate assets that 
will be used to pay for current employee medical benefits.  An employer’s contribution is tax-
deductible and the VEBA earns tax-free interest. The employer also controls the funding and 
administration of the VEBA.  Traditional VEBAs are likely to cover both retirees and current 
employees.  These VEBAs are typically used to pay for current health care costs; most are not 
substantially pre-funded due to the restrictions on pre-funding for non-union companies and the 
irrevocable nature of the trust (O’Brien, 2008).   
In addition to these traditional company-run VEBAs, a new model of stand-alone VEBAs 
has grown in popularity in the last 10 years: the independent entities, separate from employer 
sponsors.  In this latter case, a company typically makes a large one-time contribution to fully or 
partially fund the VEBA, in exchange for divesting itself of the current and future benefit 
obligation. The first stand-alone VEBA was formed in the early 1980s; however, the model has 
become more common during the 2000s (Sibson Consulting, 2008).  The establishment of the 
UAW Retiree Medical Benefits Trust following the UAW’s 2007 negotiations with the US 
automakers was a highly-publicized stand-alone VEBA, and it generated a great deal of interest 
in this structure. Stand-alone VEBAs typically arise from bankruptcy, class action settlements, or 
proactive negotiation, often from a company facing financial difficulty.  
A 2008 benefits consulting study conducted by Sibson Consulting cited corporate 
bankruptcy as the most common reason for the formation of a stand-alone VEBA (Sibson 
Consulting, 2008).  Employers may use the bankruptcy process to modify or terminate health 
benefit obligations, but these changes must be approved by the bankruptcy court.  As part of 
these negotiations, the company may set up a defeasance VEBA in order to settle the retiree 
benefit claims. While the contribution to these VEBAs is typically much less than the full 
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amount of the benefit obligation, it still may be a favorable compromise for retirees who 
otherwise simply hold a general unsecured claim and hence stand to receive very little through 
the course of bankruptcy proceedings.  The stand-alone model works well out of bankruptcy 
because it establishes an organization separate from the company, which may or may not be a 
going concern out of bankruptcy.  The VEBA will be responsible for the administration of 
benefits and the investment of remaining assets.  Examples of VEBAs formed out of bankruptcy 
include the Dana Corporation (Borzi, 2009), which set up both union and non-union VEBAs, and 
the City of Detroit, which has recently agreed to set up a VEBA for retired city workers (Dolan, 
2014). 
When a company terminates or modifies its retiree health care benefit plan, retirees may 
file a class action lawsuit to prevent such a change in benefits.  Since ERISA does not require 
that retiree health benefits be vested, the retirees’ case will hinge on whether the company has 
contractually agreed to the vesting of such benefits.  Courts are generally more likely to rule in 
favor of the employees in cases involving collective bargaining agreements (Moore, 2008).  
Settlement of the class action lawsuit may result in a stand-alone VEBA.  For instance, Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Company funded a VEBA for retirees of the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, 
Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union 
(USW) in 2008 following a class action lawsuit filed by the USW after Goodyear modified 
benefits; nevertheless, the USW was able to successfully defend much of the benefits.  Goodyear 
funded the VEBA with $1 billion in assets; a funded ratio of 83% given its $1.2 billion liability 
(O’Brien, 2008). 
Stand-alone VEBAs have also been established in the absence of bankruptcy or class 
action.  These can be formed where there is a fear of financial distress; in such an instance, the 
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company seeks to reduce its liability while the union is willing to accept the VEBA structure as 
preferable to the possibility of company bankruptcy. The best example of this is the UAW 
VEBA agreement with the US automakers in 2007. 
 
The UAW Retiree Medical Benefits Trust 
A more detailed discussion of the UAW VEBA is worthwhile as this was by far the 
largest transaction of its kind and helped to publicize the VEBA structure as a win-win solution 
for employers and workers with large retiree health care benefits.  The establishment of the 
UAW Retiree Medical Benefits Trust marked an unprecedented offloading of company benefit 
obligations from their balance sheets.  General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler established the 
VEBAs with a total of $56.5 billion in funding, removing a total $88.7 billion liability from the 
automakers’ financial statements (O’Brien, 2008). This difference was partly the result of 
changes to accounting assumptions and partly made up by union contributions. 
At the time of the 2007 UAW-automaker labor negotiations, the Big Three US 
automakers were shouldering substantial payments for retiree health care liabilities.  It was clear 
during the 2007 labor negotiations between the UAW and General Motors1 that retiree health 
benefits had become a key issue.  Leading up to this point, General Motors had become the 
largest private purchaser of health care in the US, spending $5.4 billion on medical benefits in 
2005 to cover 1.1 million active and retired workers.  Of this health care burden, more than two-
thirds was spent on retiree coverage.  Retiree health care costs added $1,045 to the cost of each 
GM vehicle, on average.  In comparison, Japanese automakers spent $450 per vehicle on all 
medical benefits, for both active employees and retirees (Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, 2007).  
1 UAW collective bargaining policy is to negotiate a deal with one of the three automakers, in this case GM.  The 
other two automakers have typically agreed to uphold similar deal terms. 
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For the UAW, these health care benefits had been put in place over many years of labor contract 
negotiations and were counted on by employees. 
While the establishment of the stand-alone UAW VEBA in 2007 was unprecedented in 
its size and funding arrangement, a 2005 agreement between GM and the UAW paved the way 
for this transaction.  In 2005, the union agreed to concessions that reduced GM’s $67.6 billion 
retiree health care obligation by $17 billion.  The UAW further gave up $5.6 billion in future 
wage hikes and cost of living adjustments.  Additionally, GM set up a traditional VEBA, funded 
with cash and a portion of future profit sharing (Bernstein, 2010). 
In both the 2005 and then the 2007 negotiations, GM made retiree healthcare a key 
bargaining issue.  GM demanded that the UAW agree to significant cuts in retiree medical 
benefits.  Initially, the UAW refused.  GM then threatened to simply impose the cuts anyway, 
arguing that it had the right under ERISA to modify welfare benefits.  The UAW was faced with 
a decision: the union could agree to negotiate benefit cuts or it could file a class action lawsuit if 
the company cut the benefits separately.  Although courts have generally given weight to 
collective bargaining agreements, there was no guarantee as to how a court would rule. 
In the past, the UAW had resisted cuts to retiree medical benefits. Now, however, the 
UAW could not ignore the troubled financial state of the US automakers. All three companies 
had experienced steep stock market declines, concurrent with falling earnings. GM’s credit rating 
fell to junk status at the beginning of 2005. The companies had attempted to respond; GM laid 
off 37,000 employees, closed factories, made cuts to executive salaries, and slashed its dividend 
(Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, 2007).  Even before the financial crisis devastated the US 
economy, the US automakers faced a very real threat of bankruptcy. While pension promises are 
guaranteed in bankruptcy by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, there is no such 
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organization to backstop health care benefit promises.  If the UAW held out for a hard bargain, it 
risked contributing to further financial woes at GM and the other automakers.  In the event of 
bankruptcy, it risked substantial benefit cuts. 
Faced with this possibility, the union decided to compromise.  A stand-alone VEBA had 
the potential to benefit both parties. At the time of the negotiation settlement, GM’s retiree health 
care liability was $51 billion, more than twice its market capitalization of $21 billion (Ahrens 
and Freeman, 2007).  For the union, having control of these benefit assets would mean that they 
would be out of reach of bankruptcy claims should the companies’ financial troubles continue. 
The UAW insisted that the VEBA trust be fully funded to meet the future retiree 
obligations; however, the union made concessions on the financial assumptions used to value the 
obligation in order make full funding a reality. To determine costs that the VEBA would be 
expected to incur in the future, both sides had to agree on an appropriate medical inflation figure, 
eventually settling on 5%.  The return assumption agreed to was 9% (Bernstein, 2010). Although 
these figures were not outside the range of acceptable values, the UAW was viewed as having 
made concessions on both figures.  For the inflation rate, a 5% assumption was well below the 
recent level of health care cost increases.  Yet this assumption is to be used over the VEBA’s 
long-term time horizon of 80 years and is in line with other organizations’ projections, including 
Medicare.  The 9% rate of return assumption could also be viewed as aggressive, given that GM 
uses a much more conservative 6% to project its own asset growth (Bernstein, 2010). 
These aggressive financial assumptions reduced the amount of assets required to bring 
the VEBA to full funding. Using the 5% assumption for medical inflation, the present value of 
the retiree health care obligation was $47 billion, below the $51 billion GM had carried on its 
books. Additionally, given that the 9% rate of return assumption was higher than the 6% 
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assumption GM used on its financial statements, the present value was further reduced from $47 
billion to $38 billion.  GM was able to further benefit from this accounting change as it was able 
to book an accounting profit for this difference (Bernstein, 2010).  
Nevertheless, these concessions did heighten the risk of funding shortfalls in the future, 
in the event that the cost and return assumptions prove too aggressive. To alleviate union 
concerns about underfunding, GM agreed to backstop the VEBA: the company set aside $1.74 
billion in contingency payments. Moreover, GM agreed that it will make a payment to the VEBA 
in any year in which the Trust assets fall below the present value of the subsequent 25-year 
obligation (Bernstein, 2010).    
Much of the subsequent negotiation focused on how funding would be divided.  Both 
sides made significant compromises, and ultimately the funding amount was shared by the UAW 
and GM: $30.21 billion was funded by GM, with $8.1 billion from the union.  For GM, funding 
was split between a transfer from the existing VEBA, additional cash assets, a note convertible to 
GM stock, excess pension assets, and a prior negotiated VEBA-payment.  The UAW funded its 
portion with foregone wage raises from the 2005 contract as well as additional foregone wages 
and cost of living adjustments. 
Similar structures were put in place with Ford and Chrysler.  Ford contributed $13.6 
billion and Chrysler contributed $10.6 billion. The resulting UAW Retiree Medical Benefits 
Trust was actually three distinct VEBAs set up for the three automakers, although the trusts wer 
to be governed and invested similarly. Indeed, they are often referred to as a single entity.  In 
total, the three companies pledged $56.5 billion to the new VEBAs, thereby reducing the 
uncertainty of a $88.7 billion retiree health care liability from their financial statements 
(O’Brien, 2008). 
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These transactions generated a great deal of buzz, and the press lauded the structure as an 
example of an innovative compromise.  Yet shortly after the VEBA settlement agreements were 
put into place, the global economy entered a recession and the automotive industry was severely 
impacted.  GM and Chrysler borrowed $14 billion from the Bush Administration’s Troubled 
Assets Relief Program in the fall of 2008 (Ghilarducci, 2010).  After seeking additional 
government loans in early 2009, Chrysler and General Motors filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 
April and June 2009, respectively. The US government assisted in these bankruptcies, expediting 
the legal process and taking an equity stake in the companies through debtor-in-possession 
financing as well as additional financial support following the restructurings. 
At the time of their Chapter 11 filings, GM owed $20 billion to the UAW VEBA and 
Chrysler owed $10.6 billion.  Because these funds had not yet been transferred into the VEBA 
trust, the VEBA was considered an unsecured creditor, though the VEBA funding had been 
agreed to under a Federal District Court settlement agreement in 2008 (Ghilarducci, 2010).  
Because of this, these claims were considered more secure than they otherwise would have been, 
although the Obama administration received criticism that it was favoring union retirees at the 
expense of taxpayers (Sherk and Zywicki, 2012).  As a result of the bankruptcy proceedings, 
both GM and Chrysler replaced half of their remaining VEBA funding with company stock.  Of 
GM’s $20 billion owed, approximately $10 billion of the obligation was paid in shares of post-
bankruptcy GM stock that gave the UAW as much as a 39% percent ownership stake in the 
restructured firm.  Similarly, of Chrysler’s $10.6 billion, $6 billion was granted in Chrysler 
shares, giving the VEBA a 55% ownership stake in the restructured Chrysler.  Additionally, the 
VEBA received seats on both the General Motors and Chrysler Boards (Ghilarducci, 2010). 
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At year-end 2012, the UAW Retiree Medical Benefits Trust had combined assets of 
$58.8 billion.  The Trust paid $4.2 billion in medical benefits in 2012 and administrative fees of 
$284 million (UAW Retiree Medical Benefits Trust, 2013).  While the Trust does not release the 
amount of its outstanding liability, it is believed that the funded ratio has improved since the 
Trust’s inception following a rebound in financial markets.  In 2010, the Trust was underfunded 
by roughly $20 billion.  In calendar year 2011, Trust assets fell to $52.4 billion while the benefit 
obligation rose to $85.3 billion, a $33 billion shortfall (Seetharaman and Woodall, 2012).  Given 
the level of underfunding, the Trust expects cost sharing with retirees to increase (Greene, 2012). 
While the UAW accepted shares of GM and Chrysler in place of a portion of their cash 
contributions to the VEBAs, the UAW did not intend to remain a long-term shareholder of these 
companies. The VEBA has reduced its ownership of General Motors’ shares over time (UAW 
Retiree Medical Benefits Trust, 2013), and it sold its remaining shares in Chrysler in early 2014 
to Fiat SpA as part of that carmaker’s purchase of Chrysler (Trop, 2014).  
 
Impact of the Affordable Care Act 
In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the “ACA”) 
instituting a national health care program that would set up health care exchanges for individuals 
not covered under their employer plans. Recognizing the unsustainability of the current model, 
the UAW supported the passage of a national health insurance program.  In fact, the labor 
agreements that established the UAW VEBAs called for the auto companies to donate $30 
million to establish a National Institute for Health Care Reform (O’Brien, 2008).  Within the text 
of the agreements, the companies also agreed to support efforts to “improve the affordability, 
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accessibility, and accountability of the U.S. health care system and the pursuit of a lasting 
solution to our national health care crisis.”  
Prior to the ACA, pre-65 retirees (those not yet eligible for Medicare) had few 
alternatives for insurance outside of employer-provided promises.  Individual coverage for this 
age cohort was extremely expensive (McArdle, 2014).  The creation of the health insurance 
exchanges offers this population a viable alternative for coverage. 
As the national exchanges established under the ACA now provide a suitable option for 
pre-Medicare retirees, employers will be even more incentivized to reduce their own retiree 
coverage as the pushback from current and former employees losing coverage is likely to be less 
significant.  As a result, the ACA is likely to accelerate the employer trend away from providing 
retiree health benefits.  To the extent that the ACA reduces the need or obligation of employers 
to provide retiree health care, there is likely to be a reduced role for VEBA plans going forward.   
Evidence of this is seen in the sharp drop in the number of VEBA plans from 2010 to 
2011 (Internal Revenue Service, 2010 and 2011).  Based on this drop, it is unclear whether 
employers are simply shifting their health care funding to defined contribution-style health care 
accounts or whether they are moving away from coverage for retirees altogether. ACA experts 
such as Ezekiel Emanuel, an architect of the ACA and University of Pennsylvania Professor, 
predict that employers will drop health insurance for their employees as faith in the exchanges 
grows (Mandelbaum, 2014).   
While most employers have indicated that they do not intend to alter coverage for active 
employees, Dr. Emanuel’s prediction may play out among retiree medical benefits first. In the 
2014 Towers Watson/National Business Group on Health Survey, nearly two-thirds of 
companies that currently provide an employer-sponsored health care plan to pre-65 retirees said 
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they were likely to eliminate these programs in the next few years and move their pre-Medicare 
retirees to the public exchanges (Towers Watson and the National Business Group on Health, 
2014).  A 2013 ACA Impact Survey conducted by the International Foundation of Employee 
Benefit Plans found 27% of employers with more than 5,000 workers considering moving 
retirees to the exchanges (Figure 2).  This is a lower but still substantial percentage. 
 
Figure 2: Employers Considering Moving Retirees to Exchanges 
                                     
Source: International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans, 2013 Employer-Sponsored Health 
Care: ACA’s Impact Survey 
 
The Affordable Care Act includes several provisions which directly impact pre-65 
retirees.  A discussion of these provisions and their potential impact on the VEBA structure 
follows. 
Health Insurance Exchanges – By far the most significant piece of the legislation for retirees.  
The exchanges will provide guaranteed issue access to insurance for the 15% of retirees aged 55 
to 64 without any health coverage and the 11% of those who have individually purchased plans 
(McArdle, 2014).  Employers may elect to cancel their coverage and send retirees to the 
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exchanges.  Additionally, retirees will be able to choose between an employer plan and coverage 
through the exchanges (Reuther, 2014). 
Early Retiree Reinsurance Program (ERRP) – The ERRP was set up as a temporary reinsurance 
program for employers providing benefits to retirees over age 55 and not yet eligible for 
Medicare.  The program was intended to incentivize employers to maintain retiree benefits until 
the public health exchanges became operational (Fronstin, 2010).  The program was funded with 
$5 billion to provide employers, but demand quickly exceeded this amount.  The program was 
wound down January 1, 2014; however, the significant demand for help in funding retiree 
coverage highlighted the need for employer relief from retiree medical costs (McArdle, 2014).  
The popularity of this program suggests that employers are eager to find solutions for growing 
retiree medical costs and seems to suggest that many employers will seek to move retirees to the 
exchanges.  This trend would lower the number of VEBA trusts. 
 “Cadillac tax” on high-cost health plans. Beginning in 2018, the ACA will impose a non-
deductible excise tax on high-cost employer-sponsored plans.  For pre-65 retirees, the tax will be 
equal to 40% of the value of coverage in excess of $11,850 for an individual or $30,950 for a 
family (McArdle, 2014).  This tax will likely encourage employers to scale back benefits further 
or, at a minimum, to review the coverage offered.  This review may contribute to the trend away 
from employer-provided coverage. 
Retiree-only plan exemptions - Retiree-only plans are exempt from some of the more costly 
requirements of the ACA, such as extending medical plan eligibility to adult children through 
age 26, unlimited annual or lifetime expenses for essential health benefits, and fully-covered 
preventive health services with no patient cost sharing.  For employers who currently offer a 
combined health care plan for both active and retired workers, there will an incentive to split 
17 
 
these plans in order to reduce costs within the retiree plan (McArdle, 2014).  This splitting could 
lead to growth in VEBA plans as employers set up new structures specifically for their retirees.  
Yet it seems possible that any carve-out of retirees may encourage employers to reevaluate and 
reduce these benefits, potentially recommending that the retirees move onto the exchanges for 
coverage. 
Restrictions on VEBA fund payouts – The ACA’s greatest blow to the VEBA plan structure may 
be the restrictions placed on VEBA trust payments.  The ACA legislation prohibits tax-
advantaged accounts, including VEBAs, flexible spending accounts (FSAs), and health 
reimbursement accounts (HRAs) from paying all or part of a beneficiary’s exchange premiums 
(Reuther, 2011).  This means that even as the trend is likely to move towards placing pre-65 
retirees on the national exchanges, the VEBA structure will not be available to support this trend 
by offsetting the costs of the premiums.  Additionally, VEBA payouts cannot be used for 
supplemental wrap coverage to any retiree electing coverage through the state or government 
exchanges (Woodward, 2014).   
These restrictions were put in place to avoid “double dipping” of public subsidies; they 
restrict the use of tax-advantaged funds in paying for subsidized exchange benefits (Reuther, 
2011).  VEBAs are at a further disadvantage, however, because their structure does not allow 
them to make taxable payouts either.  Therefore, the use of VEBA funds will be severely limited.  
For employers who wish to move retirees to the exchanges, or at least keep this option available, 
VEBAs look less attractive under the ACA.  Already, defined contribution health care plans 
appear to be gaining in popularity as they offer employees greater flexibility.  In the 2013 Aon 
Hewitt Retiree Health Care Survey, when employers were asked what long-term strategies they 
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favored in light of the ACA changes, the highest percentage responded that they were 
considering a defined contribution strategy (Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Long-Term Strategies for Pre-65 Retirees 
               
Source: Aon Hewitt, 2013 Retiree Health Care Survey 
VEBAs may still have a role to play, particularly for trusts set up at large employer or 
union plans.  Unlike active employees, who are restricted from seeking coverage through the 
exchanges if their employer offers coverage, retired employees will be able to shop between the 
VEBA-provided health plan and the exchanges.  In many cases, the VEBA plan is likely to be 
more generous, particularly where unions have negotiated the packages.  Union pressure is also 
likely to limit the movement of unionized workers to the exchanges if benefits are not as rich.   
While VEBAs cannot pay exchange premiums for pre-65 retirees, they can be used to 
pay employee Medicare premiums.  This will likely remain an important role for already-
established VEBAs (Woodward, 2014).  However, if VEBAs create a gap in employer coverage 
because they are unable to pay for pre-65 retiree exchange premiums or supplemental coverage, 
they are unlikely to bring retirees back into the plan once they become Medicare-eligible. 
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Overall, the Affordable Care Act should lead to improved medical benefits for retirees, 
particularly those ineligible for Medicare who had few options under the current system.  Given 
the high cost associated with provided pre-65 retiree medical coverage and the availability of the 
insurance exchanges, it is expected that many employers will consider reducing their retiree 
coverage.  The reduction in retiree medical benefits will reduce the overall need for VEBA plans.  
The restrictions on using VEBA assets to pay exchange premiums will accelerate this decline in 
usage. 
In sum, VEBAs will continue to play a useful, albeit reduced, role in providing employee 
and retiree health benefits.  While the overall trend is moving away from employer-provided 
retiree medical care, this has been much slower within unionized plans.  As a reference point, in 
2006, 86% of collectively-bargained employers continued to offer retiree health benefits 
(Cancelosi, 2009).  Unions have been relatively successful in protecting these benefits, and 
VEBAs have helped them do so.  VEBAs also continue to be a primary vehicle for safeguarding 
benefit assets for firms in or near financial distress.  Also, as public plans come under increased 
pressure to manage their pension and welfare benefits, the VEBA structure could be an attractive 
compromise for these governments and retirees. 
 
Have VEBAs served their purpose? 
Traditional VEBAs have certainly benefited many employees, since the VEBA is one of 
the few ways for employers to fund employee health care in a tax-advantaged structure.  These 
tax advantages have become more and more important as health care costs have grown and as 
accounting rules require companies to disclose the full amount of their medical benefit liabilities.  
There is expected to be a reduced need for traditional VEBAs going forward as the Affordable 
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Care Act provides new options for employee health care and as it restricts the uses of VEBA 
funds. 
Stand-alone VEBAs have also provided a benefit to employees; however, the outcome 
varies widely from plan to plan. Ultimately, the stand-alone model moves the risk and 
responsibility for employee benefits out of the employer’s hands and into the care of the VEBA 
trust, typically run in practice by a union or a collection of employees.  Stand-alone VEBAs are 
often significantly underfunded, especially when formed out of a bankruptcy event or a class 
action lawsuit.  Employees are thus forced to accept benefits below the level they expected.  
Nevertheless, VEBAs have been valuable to employees because they have offered a favorable 
compromise between the company and its workers. For firms in financial distress, a VEBA 
structure offers the best way to ensure benefits will be safeguarded from other creditors in the 
event of bankruptcy. For firms in bankruptcy, the VEBA structure may be the best way to 
administer and distribute benefits to employees when the future of the company is in question. 
VEBAs have also been very important in providing benefits to pre-Medicare retirees, 
who had few options for good health insurance prior to the Affordable Care Act’s insurance 
exchanges.  By pooling retirees under a VEBA, the plans could now offer affordable coverage.  
The VEBA structure also safeguarded these benefits which were quickly being modified or 
terminated by employers.  
 
Conclusions 
The past two decades have seen U.S. employers reduce the health benefits they provide to 
retirees, as health care costs and the balance sheet liabilities for these costs have grown.  For 
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many employers and retirees, VEBA plans have served as creative compromises to protect 
retiree health coverage.   
In particular, stand-alone VEBAs have been formed by companies that face financial 
distress or those in bankruptcy proceedings.  By separating the benefit risk and responsibility 
from the employer, the employer is able to reduce this uncertainty from its books.  While the 
employees must assume this risk, they benefit by safeguarding these benefits from future credit 
issues.  In this way, VEBAs have offered a tax-advantaged and innovative compromise for 
employers and workers.   
Nevertheless, the Affordable Care Act is likely to accelerate the employer trend away 
from offering retiree health care as insurance exchanges provide a satisfactory alternative to 
employer-provided coverage.  Even for employers who do wish to offer employees supplemental 
coverage or help paying premiums, the VEBA structure does not support these payments and 
employers may look to defined contribution health care plans as more versatile alternatives.  
VEBA plans will remain a presence for some time; many outstanding VEBAs, including the 
UAW Retirement Trusts, have long horizons, VEBAs continue to remain a favored vehicle for 
carving out employee health benefits in bankruptcy, and the tax advantages to union workforces 
continue to make these appealing. We predict, however, that the overall role and number of 
VEBA plans will continue to decline.  
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